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RESEARCH ARTICLE

Enhancing Marine Administrative Management
Based on Human Factor Through Safety Criteria
Wen-Cheng Lin, Hsin-Hung Cheng*
Department of Business Administration, National Taipei University of Business, Taiwan, ROC
Institute of Transportation, Ministry of Transportation and Communication, Taiwan, ROC

Abstract
This study aims to improve maritime safety by enhancing administrative management based on human factors. This
study used Fuzzy analytic hierarchy process to analyze the risks and threats regarding safety maritime criteria. Establishing administrative reform is given the highest priority. First, the current model for crew training system is explored.
Second, the marine surveyor is examined to determine if it is professional enough for inspection work. Third, the
investigation system used by maritime safety investigators should be inspected. The suggestions mentioned expect to
establish a maritime administrative reform that could pave the way for the application of maritime safety around the
world.
Keywords: Marine management, Taiwan water, Fuzzy analytic hierarchy process

1. Introduction

T

he effective management and maintenance
of safety of coastal shipping around a harbor
is a challenge for island nationals, especially in
major maritime transport of world shipping
routes. The total coastline of Taiwan stretches up
to 1140 km and lies off the Paciﬁc Ocean with
Eurasia. Thus, Taiwan has superior trafﬁc location
in Asia. Taiwan experiences scarcity in natural
resources because it is a small nation. At present,
over 90% of Taiwan's resources are transported by
sea. Taiwan is ranks 14th among the top 20
container ports in the world. The rapid economic
growth of China helped increase the economy,
trade, and number of ships operated between
Taiwan and China; an increase in the number of
maritime ships in Taiwan and other countries was
also observed. This information shows that
Taiwan plays a key maritime role in Asia and the

world. However, this development also means
that any marine accident that occurs around
Taiwan waters will leave a negative impact on
maritime transport across Taiwan and China and
even across Asia and the world. Therefore,
maritime authorities should propose effective
policies for improving maritime safety to avoid
the occurrence of maritime accidents.
The United Nations enacted the International
Convention Relating to Intervention on the High
Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties (INTERVENTION) in 1969 and the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in
1982 to avoid the occurrence of marine accidents,
which clearly deﬁned the meaning of maritime casualties and marine accidents. The Code of International Standards and Recommended Practices for
a Safety Investigation into a Marine Casualty or
Marine Incident (Casualty Investigation Code)
Resolution MSC.255 (84) also clearly deﬁne the type
of marine accidents [1]. Vessel technologies are
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developed every year, but marine accidents
continue to occur [2]. Thus, an increasing number of
studies were published to avoid marine accidents
from happening. These studies include discussions
on different types of ship collision [3] and hull/
machinery damage [4] and improvement of management methods [5,6]. The Formal Safety Assessment
(FSA)
for
International
Maritime
Organization (IMO) and Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) were adopted in the assessment and
management of maritime accidents based on
human factors [7]. An increasing number of studies
also explored maritime management to help reduce
the risk of marine accidents [8e11]. These studies
reached a unanimous consensus that a safe maritime environment can be maintained through
administrative reform. Taiwan's maritime authorities consider the domestic condition of Taiwan and
international situations to propose effective maritime safety strategies.
In the 1970s, Saaty is a well-established multicriteria method in which factors are organized in
hierarchical structures and developed the analytic
hierarchy process (AHP) [12]. It assists by ranking
alternatives and choosing the most efﬁcient alternative among multiple criteria. Although typical
AHP has been widely recognized as an effective
decision making tool, through the last two decades,
its fuzzy extension have gained popularity among
researchers and practitioners. In MCDM, fuzziness
arises because of DMs’ limited capacity to deal with
complexity. The goal of this study is based on the
human factor to propose maritime administrative
reform through Fuzzy AHP. Speciﬁcally, it is to
enhance the administration management to increase maritime safety and reduce accidents rate.
From the past years of marine accidents statistics, it
is hoped that the insights offered by this paper will
contribute positivity towards the policy recommendations. Among them, what is worth discussing is
the concrete measures to realize the interrelationships issues within crews, ships and maritime safety
so that we can understand the importance of human
inﬂuence between them.
This paper is structured as follows. Next section
introduces Taiwan's marine management system,
including the current situation of maritime administration, maritime personnel development and
employment. Section 3 uses Fuzzy AHP technique
to analyze maritime accident criteria and factors. In
Section 4, the authors derive policies from crews,
ships, and maritime safety to establish a framework
for maritime safety. Section 5 is for conclusions and
suggestions.
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2. Literature review
2.1. Marine management system of Taiwan
Taiwan has a long history of development of
maritime affairs. Based on its growth pattern, the
development of Taiwan's maritime affairs underwent two stages. Four separate maritime authorities
operated in four ports in Taiwan prior to 2012. They
exercised public authority and business-model
management in implementing their maritime policies. This set-up was often questioned given that
maritime authorities cornered the market of maritime affairs. Taiwan's maritime affairs underwent
another stage of development after 2012. The Maritime and Port Bureau (MPB) was established, which
is mainly responsible for handling maritime affairs.
MPB was divided into four maritime affairs centers
that handle local maritime affairs. The Taiwan International Ports Corporation Ltd. (TIPC) was
established to handle business-model management
affairs. TIPC operates for Taiwan's commercial ports.
This administrative reform was geared toward
implementation of maritime policies, increased
safety, and reduction of accident rate. Unfortunately,
some policies apparently lack effective consideration
and integration in addressing maritime cases, which
lead to the lack of systematic and organized prevention of marine accidents. Given the pattern of
maritime cases, the ﬁrst priority should be administrative management, which originated from
human factors. Therefore, the professional abilities
of maritime employers should be the top priority of
Taiwan's administrative authority to ensure administrative reform in maritime management.
2.2. Analysis of marine accidents
Statistics on marine accidents are important ways
for measuring the safety of Taiwan waters. According to Lloyd's List Intelligence Casualty [13], Taiwan
is located in a high-risk region for maritime accidents. This study analyses statistical data from MPB,
but the types of ships were not distinguished
because all ships presumably follow administrative
and consistent approaches for implementing the
policies to maintain the safety of Taiwan waters.
A total of 547 maritime accidents were recorded in
Taiwan from 2013 to 2016 [14]. Fig. 1 shows the
principal causes of maritime accidents. In terms of
numbers, collision/contact, grounding/stranding,
and others accounted for 71.3% of the total accidents. The remaining marine accidents accounted
for less than 3%, which pertained to leaking and
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Fig. 1. The principal causes of maritime accidents (Source: Maritime and Port Bureau, MOTC).

extreme misfortune. These statistics reﬂect that hull/
machinery damage, grounding/stranding, and ﬁre/
explosion did not change signiﬁcantly in recent
years, but collision/contact and others seemed to
increase. Moreover, the location of marine accidents
can serve as basis for marine treatment. To analyze
marine accidents in Taiwan waters, the Taipei Air
Defense Identiﬁcation Zone (TADIZ) was designated as research range and the median line in
Taiwan Strait was used as separation range.
According to the organization law of Taiwan,
maritime jurisdiction was divided into four regions
as shown in Fig. 2. Marine accidents that occurred in
the north (Taipei port and Keelung port)comprised
223 cases (40.77%) and 209 cases (38.21%) in the
south (Kaohsiung), 92 cases (16.82%) in the center,
and 23cases (4.2%) in the east. These statistics show
that marine accidents occurred frequently more
near the ports. This result is expected. Cockcroft
proposed the relation between collision probability
and ship density [15]. Further comparison of collision probability and ship density was provided in
Marine Trafﬁc [16], which showed that high ship
density results in increased occurrence of accidents.
Fig. 3 aims to determine the reasons marine accidents happen in these maritime affairs centers.
First, the collision/contact and other situations are
the primary reasons for accidents in the maritime
affairs center in the north, which respectively
accounted for 26.4% and 28.7%. Collision/contact
comprised 31.52% of accidents in central maritime
affairs center. Collision/contact comprised 44.5% of
accidents in the maritime affairs centers in the
south. Only a few marine accidents occurred in the

maritime affairs centers in the east, of which 44%
are attributed to other factors, 35% for collision/
contact, and 13% for grounding/stranding. Overall,
collision/contact and others are the major causes of
accidents followed by grounding/stranding and
hull/machinery damage.
According to the above analyzed Collision/Contact results from small activities water, high density
for ships around Taiwan water. For Grounding/
Stranding, the main reason is that the crews are
strange in environment. As for others, the most of
marine accidents might be caused by human. On
the other side, due to high shipping density of ships
in west of Taiwan water especially in north and
south maritime affairs centers, we consider that is
the main reason to causes accidents of Collision/
Contact and Grounding/Stranding, even worse in
south maritime affairs center. For central maritime
affairs center, except Collision/Contact and
Grounding/Stranding are much, the wire mesh is
caused that not only the central of Taiwan water is
north-south transportation through the fairway, but
also for frequent activities of ﬁshing. As for east
maritime affairs center, because of the ship's activity
is not that frequently so that the probability of
occurrence is small, but others factors might be
particularly large. Obviously, all of the maritime
affairs centers have different situations of marine
accidents.
2.3. Administrative reform
Several studies examined the relation between the
causes and effects of marine accidents [17, 18).
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Fig. 2. Distribution of marine accidents around Taiwan water area from 2013 to 2016 and each red circles represents the location of marine accidents.

Results conﬁrmed that most accidents are caused by
human factors [19]. Figure 4 shows the analysis of
the causes and effects of reconstruction of administration in humans. Initially, marine crews are
formed to provide maritime professional background through systematic education in schools or
institutes. Crewmembers then seek employment in
the marine industry and undertake shipbuilding,
engineering, and other relates tasks. In terms of ship
inspection, the major work task involves inspection
work after a ship docks at the port to ensure safety
of ship systems. During shipping, crewmembers
ensure the safety of the ship by undergoing cargo
training and education. Lack of education and
training increases the risk of marine or shipwreck
incidents. Therefore, when marine accidents
happen, a well-trained maritime investigator should

conduct comprehensive investigation of the incident
to determine the cause. The investigating authorities
should then submit a safety report or a maritime
investigative report. This process is repeated until
all human are avoided. We summarized the factors
related to crew, ship, and maritime safety.
In terms of crew-related factors, studies showed
that the majority of marine accidents are attributed
to human factors. A comparison of marine accidents
in Taiwan with statistics from other countries
showed that marine accidents in Taiwan are caused
by human factors. Thus, effective management,
exploration, and solution of crew-related factors can
reduce marine accidents in Taiwan.
In terms of ship-related factors, studies showed
that ship damage can be attributed to threat, injury,
and accident [20]. Therefore, the details of this
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Fig. 3. Distribution of Taiwan's marine accidents in the four maritime affairs centers. (Source: Maritime and Port Bureau, MOTC).

process should be examined if we want to avoid the
occurrence of marine accidents. Ship management
should also be considered in addition to technical
and maintenance issues. The management and inspection of ships should be improved.
Mistakes should not be repeated to avoid similar
accidents from happening. Preventive work is the
ﬁrst step of avoiding these incidents [21]. Reconstruction of administration, reestablishment of the
institution, and development of personnel are the
main considerations of preventive work. Human

factors in safety maritime affairs should be
enhanced to achieve preventive work and avoid
dealing with the aftermath of marine accidents.
Thus, this study proposes three aspects of administrative reform based on the cause of marine
accidents.

3. The concept of fuzzy AHP
AHP addresses subjective issues by using ‘‘fuzzy
set’’ theory based on the idea that decisions are usually not

Fig. 4. Safety assessment categories: the analysis of the causes and effects of reconstruction of administration in humans.
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absolute but are often made up of concepts that are deﬁned
only in ‘‘fuzzy’’ or relative terms [12]. Developed by
Saaty, it has been used as a method for evaluating
complex multi-criteria decision-making problems.
The method allows users to analyze both qualitative
and quantitative criteria for purposes of generating
weights of importance of the decision criteria and
measuring the relative performance of alternatives
in terms of each individual decision criterion. AHP
simpliﬁes the decision-making process by breaking
the problem into three basic steps: (1) problem
decomposition, (2) comparative judgments, and (3)
synthesizing the result [22].
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inspectors professional qualiﬁcations experience.;
and Develop a variety of maritime inspection
capabilities.
3.1.3. Maritime safety management
This is a very common criterion for evaluating a
maritime safety. In this study, we measured the
maritime safety management according to the:
Establish an independent and objective investigation organization; Develop professional maritime
investigators; and Provide safety inspection report
as a teaching materials.
3.2. Deﬁnition of the hierarchy

3.1. Criteria deﬁnition
The main objective was to select the most suitable
tool for improving maritime safety. A tool is most
suitable if it satisﬁes the following criteria:
3.1.1. Crew management
This is a very common criterion for evaluating a
maritime safety. In this study, we measured the
crew management according to the: Establishing a
uni-education system; To integrate maritime
educational resources; and Enhance students understanding on marine accident.
3.1.2. Vessel management
This is a very common criterion for evaluating a
maritime safety. In this study, we measured the
vessel management according to the: Establishment
of inspectors appointment mechanism.; Enhance

The hierarchy of the case example consists of
three criteria (Crew, Vessel, and Maritime Safety)
further analyzed into nine sub-criteria as shown in
Fig. 5. After determining the sources of maritime
accident that can be included in this study, we made
a classiﬁcation of these sub-criteria into three categories of reforms (Crew, Vessel, and Maritime
Safety), and we constructed a hierarchy, customized
to the problem under study.
This paper ﬁrst built the problem structure through
the criteria next must be prioritized. After building
the structure, the next step was to calculate pairwise
comparisons. These calculations are based on a scale
that ranges from 1 to 9, as shown in Table 1. To do
this, we needed to assign an importance value to
each criterion. We then calculated the pairwise
importance. As shown in Table 2, we had the highest
importance compared to the other criteria.

Public Administration reform

C1

Crew

C2

Vessel

SC1.1 Uni-education
system

SC2.1 Inspectors appointment
mechanism

SC1.2 Maritime

SC2.2 Professional

educational
resource
SC1.3 Understanding on
marine accidents

qualifications
experience
SC2.3 Maritime inspection
capabilities

C3

Maritime Safety

SC3.1 Investigation
organization
SC3.2 Professional
maritime
investigators
SC3.3 Safety inspection
report

Fig. 5. The Hierarchy of the public administration reform.
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4. Results
4.1. Fuzzy AHP
After checking consistency, we employ the Fuzzy
AHP process on the same judgements of the decision maker. The scale used in this study has been
proposed by Ref. [23]. The Fuzzy AHP priorities
numerical results are summarized in Table 3. The
Table 3 shows the importance of the criteria along
with their weights as percentages.
Through calculating the priorities results by Fuzzy
AHP, we found that all three perspectives have
average weights. The top three are in order: SC3.2
Professional maritime investigators; SC1.1 Uni-education system and SC2.3 Maritime inspection capabilities. We will further explore their relationship
with each other.
4.2. Develop crew training and assessment
Reducing maritime cases caused by human factors is a necessary measure. Several studies aimed
to improve the abilities and quality of the crew
Table 1. Table of labels associated with Saaty's model.
Weight

Description

1
3
5
7
9
2, 4, 6 and 8

Equally important
Equally to moderately important
Strongly more important
Very strongly important
Extremely more important
Represent compromises among the tabulated scale

Table 2. Matrix illustrations.
Criteria 1

Alternative A

Alternative B

Alternative C

Alternative A
Alternative B
Alternative C

1
1/7
1/5

7
1
1/3

5
3
1

[24,25] to avoid marine accidents and ensure safety.
Taiwan is not a member of the IMO, but crew
training in maritime education follows the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certiﬁcation and Watch keeping for Seafarers (STCW).
Moreover, certiﬁcates issued by Taiwan's maritime
authorities are recognized in other countries. All
processes should be complete regardless of maritime education or crew.
Taiwan's crew education and training evolved into
two major administrative systems, namely, education and transportation. Differences in opinion
might occur between the two systems. Crew education in Taiwan falls under the education department,
whereas
training
falls
under
the
transportation management department. The
Taiwan government often fails to establish connection between education and training, which then
results in wastage and overlap of resources. For
example, students are required to acquire maritime
education before they can obtain crew qualiﬁcation.
However, they are still required to pass the training
examination administered by the transportation
management department. In this situation, the
development goal differs from the requirements for
education and training, which then results in the
difﬁculty of improving the abilities of the crew.
Therefore, students do not only encounter difﬁculty
in obtaining crew qualiﬁcation, but they also face
increased cost and additional administrative processed in the government given the lack of a unisystem for the crew development model. This situation leads to inefﬁcient administrative enforcement
of crew management and education.
Moreover, incompatibility between the education
and transportation departments results in ineffective maritime education and failure of students to
obtain proper training. Students who need to obtain
opportunities for on-board learning should seek
opportunities from shipping companies. Moreover,

Table 3. The Fuzzy AHP priorities results.
Fuzzy priorities for criteria

C1
SC1.1
SC1.2
SC1.3
C2
SC2.1
SC2.2
SC2.3
C3
SC3.1
SC3.2
SC3.2

Fuzzy local priorities for subcriteria

l

m

u

0.3175

0.3851

0.4293

0.3074

0.3125

0.3453

0.3567

Defuziyﬁed

Normalized

0.6843
0.3177
0.4253

0.4425
0.2687
0.3319

43.40%
26.35%
32.55%

0.3215
0.3348
0.3459

0.3494
0.3458
0.3547

0.3342
0.3421
0.3569

32.77%
33.55%
35.00%

0.2113
0.4587
0.3158

0.2567
0.4629
0.3267

0.2256
0.4682
0.3259

22.12%
45.92%
31.96%

l

m

u

0.3715
0.0825
0.1528

0.4327
0.2586
0.3158

0.2159
0.2647
0.2478
0.1523
0.4185
0.2743

0.3769

0.3791

JOURNAL OF MARINE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 2021;29:266e276

schools offer limited opportunities for training and
education despite substantial efforts of maritime
schools. To promote administrative reform, this
study conducts statistical of the importance of the
education system. First, students should closely
study marine accidents including vessels, species,
and location before they can fully understand the
situation in relation to its causes and effects. The
education department should obtain data from the
transportation department and analyze them to
obtain results. Moreover, education and training
systems should be combined to improve crew abilities and avoid brain drain [26]. Therefore, government authorities should form an effective
management plan or policy to educate, train, and
manage crew and make full use of educational resources [27,28]. Past studies indicated that enhanced
maritime education and training could avoid marine
accidents [29,30]; another important approach is the
integration of education, training, and assessment to
obtain qualiﬁcation from the transportation
department. This approach may facilitate the effectiveness of the goal of education and training. Education, training, and assessment with a clear
purpose will improve crew quality and reduce marine accidents.
4.3. Enhance the ability of inspectors for the
seaworthiness of ships
Improving maritime seaworthiness is indispensable and important in maintaining the safety of
ships, promoting maritime security, avoiding
pollution of ships, and enhancing crew ability. IMOrelated resolutions were adopted by other countries
to establish organizational structures that meet
maritime conditions and implement maritime air
seaworthiness policies. This framework mainly requires countries to be responsible for policy development, development of the domestic legal system,
and the technical speciﬁcations of the convention.
These countries should organize competent
personnel to conduct inspections.
To enhance the effectiveness of inspection of
Taiwan's maritime seaworthiness, the training and
certiﬁcation of inspectors should be considered to
ensure their competence. However, this task is also
performed by executives with public power in fact
due to the scarcity of inspection professionals. If
authorities cannot effectively implement inspection,
the effectiveness of administrative work will
decrease. Therefore, the continuity of operation of
Port State Control (PSC), Flag State Control (FSC),
or Planned Maintenance Scheme (PMS) depends on
positive management by the government and
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development of personnel training, which are primary tasks of the government.
The Taiwan government has well-established
speciﬁcation for maritime rules and regulations, but
marine accidents continue to occur. Related studies
attributed these accidents to human factors in safety
management systems [31]. However, improper
operation, non-compliance with safety programs,
and lack of awareness of the management system
are other factors that cause these accidents [32].
Lack of awareness can be classiﬁed into two. The
ﬁrst instance pertains to the situation when the
inspector is not understood well in the maritime
education profession. Thus, a complicated shipping
system is difﬁcult to assess if the inspector does not
have proper education and training. The second
aspect is the lack of inspection experience. If an
inspector does not have professional knowledge and
relevant inspection experience, he or she cannot
deliver competent inspection work. Inspectors
should be able to understand that collision/contact
is the most common cause of marine accident. For
other accident-prone areas, inspectors can
strengthen inspection items. For example, the
southern area is more prone to collision; the eastern
area is affected by more factors; and the central area
is highly prone to wire mesh. The northern area is
prone to ﬁre/explosion, but not collision and others
factors. Inspectors should observe different approaches for different inspection areas because of
differences in these four areas. These capabilities
are all necessary for inspectors. The solution is to
introduce maritime professionals every year, which
could increase the standards of inspectors through
active training and annual related assessment [33].
The frequency of shipping accidents increased in
recent years. The technical safety of ships also
improved, but accidents did not decrease. Therefore, enhanced inspections can reduce the risk of
marine accidents [34]. Maritime safety is not a
problem of a single country, but a comprehensive
and international issue [35]. Administrative reform
in ship inspection should prioritized, especially inspectors' professionalism, to effectively maintain the
seaworthiness of ships. When a professional
inspector carries out inspection work, it should be
done in a timely manner to diagnose the health and
safety conditions of vessel navigation. This is the
main solution for reducing vessel failure.
4.4. Cultivate maritime investigation professionals
to improve maritime safety
An effective and feasible maritime policy is
important in ensuring the safety of crews, vessels,
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and cargoes. Taiwan's maritime authorities drafted
related policies to ensure safe navigation. The
management and implementation of policies are
critical to crew management. The main objective of
maintaining maritime safety is prevention [36]. This
study obtained the percentage of marine accidents
in Taiwan waters, but these are only numbers. The
most important work is reducing these data and
ﬁguring out solutions.
The purpose of the United Nations is to establish a
casualty investigation code based on marine accidents to investigate overall incidents and ﬁgure out
their causes. Taiwan's maritime investigation system
does not include a law on the management of Taiwan's maritime trafﬁc that could formulate the organization and content of maritime investigations.
Thus, a complete mechanism of training for investigators should be established. Chapter 16 of the
United Nation's casualty investigation code [37]
states that maritime safety investigation authorities
should do justice to the investigation work and
ensure circulation of information. Investigation work
should avoid involvement of relevant interests. The
qualiﬁcations of investigators should also be
appointed based on Item 2, Chapter 15 of Administrative Responsibility [38]. IMO Resolution A.996 (25)
states that any investigator should possess maritime
safety investigator skills and professional knowledge. Maritime investigators include captains, chief
engineers, and persons with relevant engineering
and scientiﬁc backgrounds of at least three years.
However, qualiﬁed investigators in Taiwan's maritime authorities are few. To address this problem,
maritime investigators may early make preparations
for the investigation of maritime cases. They should
be able to ﬁgure out the reason for frequent marine
accidents. Furthermore, investigators should have a
general understanding of port topography, climate,
walrus, and hydrology [39]. For example, results of
investigation of a Taiwanese research vessel that
sank in 2015 [40] showed that the accident was
caused by human factors; however, if investigators
are capable of conducting maritime investigation
and education of professionals, they could ﬁgure out
more deeply the causes of human factors and mechanical failures. Moreover, the causes of accidents
should be explored in-depth [17]. The development
of these ﬁelds cannot be cultivated overnight.
Therefore, this paper suggests that in maritime
education, except to cultivate professionals of navigational and marine engineer, it is also necessary to
train maritime investigators at the same time to help
maritime investigators can understand causal relationships so that offer suggestion based on the
evidence for future investigations [18]. For

investigators are short-handed, maritime authorities
can hire the current Captain, Chief Engineer to
accept the relevant survey education courses
temporarily, so that to have the ability to carry out
the investigation works right now. The establishment of a professional maritime investigator and
maritime accident investigation organization [4] of
professional, independent and objective can to
ﬁgure out the causes of marine accidents and reduce
the incidence of most marine accidents. Therefore, it
is important and necessary to train marine engineers and investigation professionals. Because this
paper convinced that face the maritime safety, prevention is better than aftermath. And then the precaution depends on maritime investigators ﬁnding
the real cause of the marine accidents.
With this in mind, Fig. 6 shows the study suggested that the Standard Operating Procedure
(SOP) of safety assessment administration reconstruction. First of all, for crew factors, the government should be establishing the uni-systems of
training policy immediately and to integrate
educational resources. Furthermore, the government also should according to the future marine
accidents situations to enhance the students understanding on marine accidents in Taiwan waters.
Second, part of the ship factors should be established the employment mechanism for inspectors to
enhance the professional qualities and experience of
inspectors, and ﬁnally for different maritime cases,
to strengthen the inspection abilities for ship
seaworthiness. Thirdly, for maritime safety factors,
establish an independent and objective investigation organization is necessary. Then, develop the
maritime investigators with specialty background of
maritime education and investigation. The most
important is that implement the investigation reports to offer study for students in schools. On the
other side, the maritime authorities should be
formulated a marine accidents policy in the future
direction of governance. However, we want to
emphasize that as a mention above, the all of the
crew, ship and maritime safety factors have looked
more closely relations at the causes and effects each
other. We also do expect to use these relationships
to reduce the marine casualties and accidents on
around Taiwan waters. Furthermore, the purpose of
this paper is also expected be a reference offer island or littoral national. After all, keep maritime
safety has become a global accepted trend.

5. Conclusion and suggestion
The FAHP is a powerful multi-criterion selection
tool. It can assist decision makers when selecting the
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Fig. 6. The Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) of safety assessment administration reconstruction.

most suitable criteria from among existing factors.
Enhancing the administrative reform is an effective
method to improve maritime safety and reduce the
occurrence of marine accidents. This study proposed human beings as the factor of administrative
reform. Furthermore, it focuses on three main
frameworks: First, developing the crew's education,
training and assessment to enhance the ability of
inspectors for ship's seaworthiness and cultivate the
ability of professional maritime investigation and
safety. Second, establishing the uni-training system
for crews is an effective way to enhance the quality
and ability. Third, improving the professional skills
of ship inspectors is one way to enhance ship safety.
It is true that building up the prevention work of
marine accidents is an effective way to avoid the
occurrence of other similar accidents.
This study considers that human factor is the main
inﬂuence on maritime safety. If lack of professional
training or a well-established system, not only is it
more difﬁcult to ﬁnd out the real cause of accidents,
but also hard to avoid similar cases from occurring.
Therefore, enhancing prevention work is necessary
and it is expected that administrative reform can
reduce marine accidents in the future. Eventually,
the research results of this paper can assist relevant
maritime nations to establish a uni-policy and
maritime management so that reducing the number
of marine accidents and paving the way for maritime safety to be applied throughout the world is the
main goal.
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